kant judgments of perception and experience

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Kant’s argument against the Humean skeptic, again, is that if we were not able to apply the relational categories, we would only ever be able to describe the ‘condition of the subject’—that is, the combination of representations the subject finds herself with—rather than so much as represent (justifiably or unjustifiably) how things are ‘combined in the object’. spatiotemporal forms and sensory images. Kant clearly assigns a cognitive role to sensation and allows that it is “through sensation” that we cognitively relate to objects given in sensibility (A20/B34). Kant distinguishes the three fundamental mental faculties from one another in two ways. The transcendental doctrine of the power of judgment consists of two ordered in a merely arbitrary fashion that depends on the vagaries of First, it is only in virtue of the reproductive imagination that a subject can be aware of a ‘series of perceptions,’ for it is what allows her to reproduce ‘a perception, from which the mind has passed on to another’ (A121).19 As she scans the façade of a house, for example, it is the reproductive imagination that allows her to recall and thus to keep in mind the door as she moves on to perceiving the windows. an objectively real phenomenal structure across all possible worlds of 1Norman Kemp Smith, for example, declares that ‘the illegitimacy and the thoroughly misleading character of this distinction hardly require to be pointed out’ (1918: 288). In response, it should be noted that Kant makes clear in the Paralogisms that in thinking of oneself merely as the subject of one’s thoughts, one does not in fact use the schematized category of substance, and so, succeed in thinking of oneself as a substantial object (A348–51; B410–11, see also Kraus 2019). 1970. Judgments that merely express the former awareness are not JOEs, on my view, and do not presuppose that my representations have been subsumed under the category of cause.55 Rather, as I have argued, they are merely subjectively valid JOPs. In §19, Kant again differentiates a relation between representations that counts as an ‘objective unity’ and ‘belong[s] to the understanding’ from a relation that obtains ‘in accordance with the laws of reproductive imagination (which has only subjective validity)’ (B141). “The Parity and Disparity between Inner and Outer Experience in Kant.” Kantian Review 24 (2): 171–95. Of course, it is hard to hear (4’) as a judgment one might naturally make upon carrying a body and feeling its weight. Sassen, Brigitte. an objectively valid and necessarily true synthetic a priori judgment “The Transcendental Deduction and Skepticism.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 32 (3): 359–80. events, as momentary attributions of distinct phenomenal properties “Ascribing Thoughts to Non-Linguistic Creatures.”, Carl, Wolfgang. Examples of rogue objects would include objects of When a subject makes a judgment about an object, in other words, she ‘intends’ or claims that the object is the way she represents it to be. to objects of actual or possible experience. Sassen, Brigitte. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198724858.001.0001, Ameriks, Karl. He says that judgments of perception are only "subjectively valid" and that they "only require the the logical connection of perception in a thinking subject." “Making Sense of Kant’s Schematism.”, Pereboom, Derk. So the synthetic a 51, 65–66), Hatfield (2001), Watkins (2004: 381–90) and Dyck (2011: esp. this, Kant offers the following very famous argument: The argument just sketched is a thumbnail version of the But this raises a problem. principles of pure understanding, as synthetic a priori propositions We saw in In fact, as we have seen, he provides an example of just such a combination in §19, which does not suffer from the ambiguity of his examples in the Prolegomena that engenders Schultz’s complaint. objects of experience, and the role that the categories play in 10For a detailed and very helpful account of the difference between perception and cognition in Kant that I take my discussion here to align with, see Tolley (2017). I discuss this role in §4. What is required in order to express such a judgment—as we have seen Kant argue in the Prolegomena—is the addition of a category.28 In this case, the subject subsumes the represented relation under the category of substance-inherence, thereby judging that bodies are related to weight as subject to property. In an extended passage in the Fourth Paralogism (A370-1) Kant makes the following argument: External objects (bodies) are merely appearances, hence also nothing other than a species of my representations, whose objects are something only through these representations, but are nothing separated from them. govern all conscious perceptions, and also the pure concepts of the At the heart of non-conceptualist readings of Kant stands denial that mental acts of synthesis carried out by understanding are necessary for the occurrence of cognitive mental states of the type which Kant designates by the term “intuition” [Anschauung]. valid, much less sound. possibility of our cognition of objects of experience and That is, she can judge that the objects A and B are actually related, and so, in effect, that RA and RB are correctly combined and the sequence is universally valid. He defines them thus: We cannot be certain of the existence of any material body. This is because Kant accepts that intuitions put us in a representational relation to objects that is distinct in kind from the relation that pertains to concepts. “Kant on Marks and the Immediacy of Intuition.”, Strawson, Peter Frederick. Nevertheless, she says, individual judgments can ‘remain “subjective” to a greater or lesser degree’ (1998: 83) depending on the extent to which they ‘rely uncritically’ on a subject’s particular circumstances. cannot have experience. However, the subject of these judgments is the ‘I’ which, as such, is presumably thought of as a substance (though this will need to be qualified: see note 55 below). 1992. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant says the object of representations should be understood as that which makes ‘one way of combining the manifold necessary’ (A191/B236). On this point, see Kuehn (1983: 179), and for an extended discussion, Guyer (2008: Introduction and Chs. Though Anglophone interest in Kant ebbed somewhat in the early 20th century, his conception of the mind and criticisms of rationalist psychology were again influential mid-century via the work of “analytic” Kantians such as P.F. such causal sequences of phenomenal events are temporally This amounts to claiming that any subject judging on the basis of the same evidence ought to make the same provisional judgment. 2008. Unless indicated otherwise, translations of Kant’s text are from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (ed. possible interpretations of the B Deduction; nor is it the place to 2003. What Kant adds in the Critique (and elsewhere20) is that the ‘connection of perceptions’ that are expressed by merely subjectively valid JOPs are due to the reproductive imagination;21 in contrast, the connections expressed by objectively valid JOEs are due to the understanding.22, In what follows, I will argue that we can make good sense of the various examples of JOPs Kant offers in these terms.23 First, however, it will be useful to introduce an example of the kind of circumstance in which it might strike us as more appropriate to make a JOP rather than a JOE.24.

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